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This paper offers a cartel explanation for the stability of German collective bargaining institutions.We show that a dense net of legal safeguards has been yarned around the wage setting cartel. These measures make deviation by cartel insiders less attractive and simultaneously erect entry...
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system of collective bargaining between a single industry union and the industry's employers association. Our cartel analysis … establishment of a fully tariff-enabled union. Such an endeavor must go hand in hand with the institutionalization of a competition …
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have much to gain from banding together as an association, raising their prices and eliminating non-union competition, with … profits in the form of higher wages and benefits. A threat to this cartel is an employer who wants to bargain with the union … union despite the federal labor policy of protecting an employer’s freedom in selecting its bargaining representative. This …
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The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.
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To account for the illegal nature of price-fixing agreements, detection probabilities are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly. It follows that for a trigger strategy to sustain a non-cooperative collusive equilibrium as a SPNE both the discount rate and all per-period detection probabilities have...
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An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.
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