Firms sometimes collude by agreeing on increases in list prices. Yet, the efficacy of such list price collusion is subject to discussion as colluding firms might, in principle, deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article reviews cases of list...

A number of South African price-fixing cases have been brought in markets previously characterized by legal cartels or monopolies. Furthermore, many South African markets have been liberalized since 1994, reflected in structural change in many market relationships and rendering many of the...

In recent years, South African competition authorities have initiated a number of price-fixing cases in markets where cooperation among competitors was legal and often encouraged. These markets present economists with special difficulties when estimating cartel overcharges. Conventional...

We study the welfare effects of non-binding advance price announcements. Applying a differentiated Bertrand model with horizontal products and asymmetric information, we find that such announcements can help firms to gain information on each other thereby allowing them to achieve higher profits....