This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …

trade-off between inefficient supervision and supervisor-agent collusion, showing that under certain conditions tolerating … collusion to take place helps to “correct” wrong supervisory signals and thus benefits the principal. Furthermore, the … characterization of the collusive-supervision contract shows that collusion should be allowed with one agent only …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …

decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …