Governments typically respond to a run on the banking system by temporarily freezing deposits and by rescheduling payments to depositors. Depositors may even be required to demonstrate an urgent need for funds before being allowed to withdraw. We study ex post efficient policy responses to a...

Using a new biography of banks, we examine the stability of Irish banking from 1797 to 1826 by constructing a failure rate series. We find that the ultimate cause of the frequent and severe banking crises was the crisis-prone structure of the banking system, which was designed to benefit the...

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

This paper provides empirical evidence on the behaviour of non-remunerated central bank retail deposits—an analogous deposit facility to retail CBDC—during a bank run in a regime of uninsured bank deposits. I study the 1931 bank run in Spain, following the sudden proclamation of the Second...

What is the effect of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) on financial stability? We answer this question by studying a model of financial intermediation with an endogenously determined probability of a bank run, using global games. As an alternative to bank deposits, consumers can also store...

This study utilizes new data across countries on bank supervision for the years 1999-2016 to examine the impact of supervisory powers and institutional changes in supervision. It examineskey characteristics of the banking sector, such as banking sector fragility, bank stability, activity...