This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic … mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when … he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some …

We model strategic mediation of the communication between an informed expert with a discrete type space and an … uninformed decision maker. A strategic mediator can improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the …

inability to commit to truthtelling destroys all meaningful communication in equilibrium unless there is a cost of lying. In the … neither harmful nor universal lie aversion is a factor when communication is noisy, provided individuals have time to discover …

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is … large, then even when the state is observed imperfectly, there are communication equilibria that are strictly better for the …

This paper investigates mediated communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with conflicting …

informed about their ideological positions. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority-rule voting …

This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic … mediator in a dis- crete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even … information transmission is possible with unmediated communication. …

This paper studies communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have … cheap-talk equilibria. If the firms can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when … informative cheap talk is impossible. We exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim …

other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …