In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...

In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochasticlength two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talkstated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secretintention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted...

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...

In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...

Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past...

In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n2) state-specific assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume and Easley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds according to the constant probabilities of the various states. The different...

Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners’ dilemma gamewith an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners’ dilemmagames in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperationin all but the last round. Our four main...

We experimentally investigate how affective processes influence proposers’and responders’ behaviour in the Ultimatum Game. Using a dualsystemapproach, we tax cognitive resources through time pressure andcognitive load to enhance the influence of affective processes on behaviour.We find that...

We investigate experimentally whether entry costs have an impact on the evolutionof cooperation in a social dilemma game. In particular, subjects repeatedly playthe so-called takeover game with anonymous partners randomly drawn from a fixedpopulation of participants. The game represents a social...

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almostexclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by materialincentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punishuntrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivatedplayers are...