Showing 1 - 10 of 48
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochasticlength two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talkstated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secretintention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866575
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866673
Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866708
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275033
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090483
We study two person-betting games with inconsistent commonly know beliefs, using an experimentalapproach. In our experimental games, participants bet against one another, each bettorchoosing one of two possible outcomes, and payoff odds are know at the time bets are placed.Bettors’ beliefs are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866395
Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners’ dilemma gamewith an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners’ dilemmagames in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperationin all but the last round. Our four main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866398
We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competitionon a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and imple-menting tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higherincentive intensity, higher efforts and output...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866426
We experimentally investigate how affective processes influence proposers’and responders’ behaviour in the Ultimatum Game. Using a dualsystemapproach, we tax cognitive resources through time pressure andcognitive load to enhance the influence of affective processes on behaviour.We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866456
Using a symmetric 2-person prisoners’ dilemma as the base game, each playerreceives a signal for the number of rounds to be played with the same partner.The actual number of rounds (the length of the supergame) is determined bythe maximal signal where each player expects the other’s signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866526