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Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and a passive dummy player) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263791
Does geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263869
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275033
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochasticlength two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talkstated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secretintention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866575
Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantlyaffect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question,subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and apassive dummy player) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866606
Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866708
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003229197
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090483