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Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income,...
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As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248148
Whether globalisation is good or bad for child labour depends on initial conditions and domestic policies. In countries with comparatively large endowments of educated workers, pulling down trade barriers is a policy that, together with measures aimed at relaxing the household liquidity...
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Basu and Van (1998) show that a ban on child labour may be self-enforcing under the extreme assumption that, above the subsistence level, no amount of consumption can compensate parents for the disutility of child labour. We show that a partial ban may be self-enforcing also in a more general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014505309
A series of articles beginning with Basu and Van (1989) argue that a ban on child labour may be self-enforcing in the sense that, once an equilibrium where only adults work is established, parents may have no incentive to depart from it, and the ban is no longer required. This important result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250071
Basu and Van (1998) show that a ban on child labour may be self-enforcing if, above the subsistence level, no amount of consumption can compensate parents for the disutility of child labour. We show that a partial ban may be self-enforcing, but a total one never is, if education is available,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014340123
Basu and Van (1998) show that a ban on child labour may be self-enforcing if, above the subsistence level, no amount of consumption can compensate parents for the disutility of child labour. We show that a partial ban may be self-enforcing, but a total one never is, if education is available,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014338615
As the return to education (and possibly also parental income) is uncertain, and given that the work a child does covertly for his own parents, and transfers between parents and children, are private information, the government should make school enrollment compulsory, set a legal limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008701520