December 1997 <p> In 1994 China began a profound reform of its state-owned enterprises. We first describe and characterize this progress in two areas: privatization of small state-owned enterprises at the county level and mass layoffs of excess state workers at the city level. Local governments...</p>

November 1997, Revised March 1998 (forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics) <p> Why are many of China's successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities? Using a set of provincial data, we find that the share of community public firms (Township-Village Enterprises, or TVEs)...</p>

Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1998 <p> We develop a theory of the ownership of firms in an environment without secure property rights against state encroachment. "Private ownership" leads to excessive revenue hiding and "state ownership" (i.e., national government ownership)...</p>

October 1997, (Forthcoming, American Economic Review) <p> The government's incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the tradeoff between political benefits and economic costs, the latter depending on the decentralization of government. Two effects of federalism are derived:...</p>

Pareto-improving economic reforms that also simultaneously achieve efficiency can be implemented through a strategy of "dual-track" liberalization. Its success requires the feasibility of the original plan and its continued enforcement by the state. The Chinese experience demonstrates that such...