We study how Chinese private entrepreneurs benefit from participating in politics. Using original hand-collected data on listed firms controlled by private entrepreneurs, we document a significant positive relationship between political participation and change in firm performance. We also...

From the start of China's "corporatization without privatization" process in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime apparently shareholder-empowering and determined by enabling legal norms has been altered by mandatory governance mechanisms imposed by a state administrative...

We provide a novel empirical finding that the recent anti-corruption investigations in China are associated with credit reallocation from less productive, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to more productive, non-SOEs. The empirical strategy exploits staggered investigations as exogenous shocks to...

From the start of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) "corporatization" project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities...

We examine the effect of elite connections on CEO pay and turnover decisions, using a large sample of Chinese listed firms. Our findings show that CEOs of private listed firms benefit from significantly higher salaries (a 25% increase), consistent with the resource dependence theory, whereas the...

We show that Chinese firms engaging in corrupt practices pay significantly higher salaries to their management team as well as to their directors, although important differences arise between the private and the state sector. Our evidence suggests that managers in private companies use...

A behavioral political economy framework is built on the basis of prospect theory to explain the induced and imposed institutional changes during China's market reform, giving special attention to the integrated effects of economic and political institutions. According to prospect theory, how...

This study proposes an analytical framework towards behavioral political economy of institutional change. It considers institutional changes as central government’s choices under uncertainty, which are largely driven by the strategic outcomes in a behavioral coordination game between local...

This study proposes an analytical framework towards behavioral political economy of institutional change. It considers institutional changes as central government's choices under uncertainty, which are largely driven by the strategic outcomes in a behavioral coordination game between local...

We investigate why governments restrict exports of exotic raw materials taking rare earth elements as a case study. Trade restrictions on exotic materials do not have immediate macroeconomic effects. Relocating rare earth intensive industries is found to be the main reason behind China's export...