From the start of China's "corporatization without privatization" process in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate … necessary for the continued financing of China's "state capitalism." …

major actor in China's domestic capital allocation, with an active role in strategic financing and restructuring of key …

Exploiting China's anti-corruption campaign, we show that following a decrease in corruption, firm performance improves …. Small and young firms benefit more. We identify the channels through which corruption hampers firm performance. Following … the anti-corruption campaign, the allocation of capital and labor becomes more efficient. Firms operating in ex ante more …

suggests that managers in private companies use corruption to add value to the company, making manager higher compensation … justified. We find no evidence of excessive salaries among directors in private companies. By contrast, corruption in state … companies does not add value to the firm, making corruption extractive. We find that both directors and managers of state firms …

In China, state governance in corporations serves the purpose of Party control over the political, social, and economic … and social objectives. Both objectives must be controlled and managed well through the corporate sector in order for China …

This paper analyzes understudied aspects of related party transactions (RPTs) in China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs … two types of RPTs in the SOE sector: “corruption-RPTs” and “policy-RPTs.” Corruption-RPTs are those associated with …, corruption-RPTs are always detrimental and generate cash-outflow wealth-transfers. Policy-RPTs are conducted by the government as …

In China, state governance in corporations serves the purpose of Party control over the political, social, and economic …. Both objectives must be controlled and managed well through the corporate sector in order for China to successfully advance …