Using a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions arising in over fifty cases, this paper analyses the development and current implementation of shareholder derivative actions in the courts of the People's Republic of China (“PRC”), both before and after the derivative lawsuit was explicitly...

Western economists have argued that the legal environment for the protection of minority shareholders and mechanisms for restricting the expropriation of minority shareholders will be important in determining the size and extent of a country's capital markets. In China, the protection of...

In the past decade, Asian countries have adopted various corporate governance measures with the hope that good law will facilitate capital market development. One of the measures adopted by Asian countries to revamp corporate boards is to enhance board independence by introducing the institution...

From the start of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) "corporatization" project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities...

In view of the increasingly severe exploitation of minority shareholders and the existence of double agency costs in China, it is necessary to provide strong protection for minority shareholders in China in order to build an investor-friendly system. By enabling minority shareholders to prevent...

Minority shareholders in China face the risk of exploitation by both managers and majority shareholders. This is due to owner absence and concentrated ownership structures. In reducing these double agency costs, non-legal protection has a key role to play. Four market forces have been identified...

Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for...

This paper shows that agency problems result from controlling-minority shareholder conflicts have a nonlinear causal relation with firm cash holding, and this relation hinges critically on the strength of investor protection. Using a direct measure of controlling shareholder's entrenchment...

Using a sample of 1470 cross-border mergers and acquisitions from 1997 through 2011, it finds two distinctive features of the financial market in China. First, better investor protection mechanisms at target countries, such as better law and order conditions, lower public sector corruption and...

This paper provides evidence on how executive compensation relates to firm performance in listed firms in China. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on executive compensation and ownership structure, we find for...