Using hand-collected data of bank loans and CEO turnovers in China, we investigate whether common ownership compromises creditors’ governance role when borrowers underperform. Unlike prior literature on the overall lack of bank monitoring on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, we argue...

In view of the increasingly severe exploitation of minority shareholders and the existence of double agency costs in China, it is necessary to provide strong protection for minority shareholders in China in order to build an investor-friendly system. By enabling minority shareholders to prevent...

Minority shareholders in China face the risk of exploitation by both managers and majority shareholders. This is due to owner absence and concentrated ownership structures. In reducing these double agency costs, non-legal protection has a key role to play. Four market forces have been identified...

This paper investigates the ownership concentration and corporate control of Chinese listed companies in the period of 2003-2011. The purpose is to examine the practical effect of the share structure split reform in 2005 and explore the actual outcome of the reduction of state shares of Chinese...

This Written Statement presents aspects in China's corporate governance framework, state corporate ownership and control, and the Chinese Communist Party's roles in corporate governance. It was submitted as part of a testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,...

Exit theory predicts a governance role of outside blockholders' exit threats; but this role could be ineffective if managers' potential private benefits exceed their loss in stock-price declines caused by outside blockholders' exit. We test this prediction using the Split-Share Structure Reform...

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value: (1)...

We examine whether business groups’ influence on cash holdings depends on ownership. Group affiliation can increase firms’ agency costs or benefit firms by providing an internal capital market, especially in transition economies characterized by weak investor protection and difficult...

This paper examines executive compensation in the subsidiaries of business groups in China. Analyzing a sample of China business groups (the so-called “XiZu JiTuan” in Chinese) from 2003 to 2012, we find convincing evidence of the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in the executive...

We study the dynamic causal effects of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholder on tunneling behavior in China. We use control-right-transfers as the event to conduct the study. We obtain 394 control-right-transfer samples in China corporate control market from 2001 to 2008. We use...