We develop a method to measure the fairness of school matching mechanisms and apply it to the Boston mechanism used in the Chinese college admissions system. Fairness is measured by mismatch, or the gap between the actual and fair matching outcomes. An individual's mismatch is then related to...

This study examines whether other-regarding preferences (ORPs) can predict cheating for different beneficiaries: cheating for-self, and other-regarding cheating for an in-group or an out-group member. The results show that, on the one hand, more prosocial subjects cheat less for self compared to...

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...

This paper justifies the evolution of the college admissions system in China from a mechanism design perspective. The sequential choice algorithm and the parallel choice algorithm used in the context of China's college admissions system are formulated as the well-studied Boston mechanism and the...

How do demand- and supply-side incentives interact, when there are potentially large provider income effects? We develop a simple model and empirically test it with data from China’s Essential Medications List (EML) policy, which reduced patient copayments and changed provider incentives by...