of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure …-owned enterprise controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of … state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure …-owned enterprise controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of … state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure …-owned enterprise controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of … state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that …

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly … negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010 …. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the firm's owners and the board of directors penalize CEOs for fraud …

fraud. We find that firms with well-connected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, supporting our …