At present, there is no globally accepted standard for the allocation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to shipments in road freight transportation. The only official international standard for emission calculation of transport operations is the European Norm EN-16258. However, even this norm...

This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of the introduction of adaptation on climate negotiation. The model expands the existing literature by considering a double relation between the two strategies. The common assumption that higher...

This paper prices the risk of climate change by calculating a lower bound for the price of a virtual insurance policy against climate risks associated with the business as usual (BAU) emissions path. In analogy with ordinary insurance pricing, this price depends on the current risk to which...

The literature of welfare-maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity. This paper introduces three ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously. The first method, inspired by Kant and Rawls, maximises net present welfare, without...

The paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a noncooperative steady state in the context of a model of climate change. It also explores the possibility of cooperation and attainment of an optimal steady state. It is shown that the problem is similar to that in the static model (Chander and...

This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are studied, a complete agreement for which countries...

We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emission reduction costs of one country depend on other countries? emission abatement. In an analytically tractable model, we show that international trade effects on costs and emissions can either increase or...

The literature of welfare-maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity. This paper introduces various ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously. Lower (higher) discount rates lead to higher (lower) emission reduction. Higher...

More technology implies higher welfare. Therefore, it is individually rational to cooperate on technological development. It is not individually rational cooperate on greenhouse gas emission reduction. If technology cooperation only comes with cooperation on emission reduction, incentives to...

This paper prices the risk of climate change by calculating a lower bound for the price of a virtual insurance policy against climate risks associated with the business as usual (BAU) emissions path. In analogy with ordinary insurance pricing, this price depends on the current risk to which...