Because of large economic and environmental asymmetries among world regions and the incentive to free ride, an international climate Regime with broad participation is hard to reach. Most of the so far proposed Regimes base on an allocation of emission rights that is to be perceived as fair....

This paper argues for introducing the role of capital malleability into the analysis of environmental policies. The issue is explored by means of a theoretical model, a numerical analysis and a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Considering the three approaches together is fundamental...

Global impact assessment of unilateral climate policies is commonly based on multi‐sector, multi‐region computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that are calibrated to consistent accounts of production, consumption, and bilateral trade flows. However, global economic databases such as...

Unilateral emission reduction commitments raise concerns on international competitiveness and emission leakage that result in preferential regulatory treatment of domestic energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. Our analysis illustrates the potential pitfalls of climate policy design...

As the world recovers from the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the international community should promote a mix of policies to sustain this global recovery and create jobs through reducing carbon dependency, ecological degradation and poverty. Such a Global Green New Deal...

Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are...

Analyses of public goods regularly address the case of pure public goods. However, a large number of (international) public goods exhibit characteristics of different degrees of publicness, i.e. they are impure public goods. In our analysis of transfers helping to overcome the inefficient...

This paper studies countries' incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across countries and pollution abatement is a global public good. We are motivated in part by the problem of global warming: a solution to this involves providing a global...

I develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient,...