What is a good incentive-compatible policy when one wants to respect individual choices of labor and human capital but eliminate inequalities due to unequal access to human capital and different returns to human capital, and when earnings and human capital expenditures are the only verifiable...

Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting....

We show that feasible elimination procedures Peleg, 1978 can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also provide an axiomatic characterization for the case...

We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modelled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the location of the nearest public bad to their dips. A social choice function or rule...

Collective decision making problems can be seen as finding an outcome that is closest to a concept of consensus. 1 introduced Closeness to Unanimity Procedure as a first example to this approach and showed that the Borda rule is the closest to unanimity under swap distance a.k.a the 2 distance....

The well-known swap distance (Kemeny (1959); Kendall (1938); Hamming (1950)) is analyzed. On weak preferences, this function was characterized by Kemeny (1959) with five conditions; metric, betweenness, neutrality, reducibility, and normalization. We show that the same result can be achieved...