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On merge properties of the Shapley value

Derks, Jean J. M.; Tijs, Stef - In: International game theory review 2 (2000) 2/3, pp. 249-257

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001613970

Derks, Jean J. M.; Haller, Hans - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 28 (1999) 2, pp. 173-187

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001434069

On the core of a collection of coalitions

Derks, Jean J. M.; Reijnierse, Hans - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 27 (1998) 3, pp. 451-459

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001437294

Consistent restricted Shapley values

Derks, Jean J. M. - In: Mathematical social sciences 33 (1997) 1, pp. 75-91

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001220800

The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure : an axiomatic characterization

Amer, Rafael; Carreras, Francese; Giménez, José Miguel - In: Mathematical social sciences 43 (2002) 1, pp. 45-54

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001640756

Modifaction of semivalues for games with coalition structures

Amer, Rafael; Giménez, José Miguel - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 54 (2003) 3, pp. 185-205

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001839279

A method to calculate generalized mixed modified semivalues : application to the Catalan Paliament (legislature 2012-2016)

Giménez, José Miguel; Puente, María Albina - In: Top : transactions in operations research 23 (2015) 3, pp. 669-684

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011554615

Weighted Nucleoli

Derks, Jean; Haller, Hans H. - 1999

Cooperative games in characteristic function form (TU games) are considered. We allow for variable populations or carriers. Weighted nucleoli are defined via weighted excesses for coalitions. A solution satisfies the Null Player Out (NPO) property, if elimination of a null player does not affect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192729