weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …

coalition with the agents who most desire, or least desire, the public good, and we may observe 'strange bedfellow' coalitions …

multiple majority coalitions (pivotality) or from the relative vote share the agent contributes to a coalition (proportionality …). We distinguish between coalitional commitment, where parties defer distributive bargaining when forming a coalition, and … allocative commitment, where allocations are determined at the point of coalition formation. We show how the timing of commitment …

We propose a five-player common-pool resource (CPR) game with endogenous coalition formation. We show that the level of … extraction from the CPR depends on the size of each coalition that is formed and on the final coalition structure. These … predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment. We consider two treatments: dictator vs. veto. In the dictator treatment, at …

test the robustness of theoretical predictions. To illustrate this point we conduct a three-person bargaining experiment … examining the effect of different decision rules (unanimity and majority rule). Our experiment implements the substantive … those obtained from an earlier experiment which implemented the specific procedural assumptions of the model. Our results …