Showing 1 - 10 of 1,527
balance. When ambiguous mechanisms are not allowed, under every prior, there exists an efficient allocation that is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242607
We examine the welfare properties, coalition-proofness and order-theoretical structure of the set of Nash equilibria in pure strategy games with a-aggregative simple strategic substitutes and monotone a-aggregative externalities. For these games, we prove the equivalence among the set of Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170844
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159
We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050225
-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus. We discuss the following applications of the new game: cooperation as an allocation in one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957415
coalition structure formation mechanism. Every game has two outcomes - an allocation of players over coalitions and a payoff … Shapley value. Presence of individual payoff allocation makes it different from a strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964183
This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups when faced with the common objective of securing a prize by exerting costly effort. The model presented adopts an axiomatic approach by assuming certain properties for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289287
This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups when faced with the common objective of securing a prize by exerting costly effort. The model presented adopts an axiomatic approach by assuming certain properties for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294669
This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition formation is formulated as an infinitely repeated game in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074595
This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups when faced with the common objective of securing a prize by exerting costly effort. The model presented adopts an axiomatic approach by assuming certain properties for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013192369