In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs, insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions...

This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs, insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions...

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.