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This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining … agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto … profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009786453
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191379
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325839
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383244
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255786
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867502
with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization. -- collective bargaining ; union ; firm ; bargaining power …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230679
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068560
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185817
In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e. without unions). If unions are sufficiently risk-averse, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011618302