colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise … reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …

colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

We study the principal’s optimal response to collusion in an adverse selection environment. Building on the framework … study a stronger collusion when the agents can coordinate their participation decisions in addition to the joint play of the … the private information is distributed continuously. We characterize the set of implementable collusion-proof outcomes of …

The analysis of auctions is an active area of research for both theoretical and empirical economists. This paper … provides an overview of the literature relevant to the econometrics of auctions from a structural approach perspective. The …

colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we … discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction … – a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details …

behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced … back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we … show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive …

We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential …

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …