formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both … in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust … forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime. …

Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and … agent that defects from fines and from other agents' punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in …

to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud. …

several other forms of crimes that share cartels' strategic features, including corruption and nancial fraud. …

Leniency policies offering immunity to the first cartel member that blows the whistle and self-reports to the antitrust … forms of leniency (or rewards) for unveiling corruption, a policy offering immunity from antitrust sanctions may not be … for corruption. This paper assesses the extent of this problem by describing and discussing the antitrust and anti …

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments … less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a …

Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate … focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop structures that … allow them to establish trust and ensure cooperation. We analyze 15 German cartels, focusing on the individual participants …