This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when...

This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopolywith capacity-constrained firms.Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is...

This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell as this price. Under price-quantity competition...

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when...

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely reaped multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when...

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when...