Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov...

We study the degree of precommitment that is required to eliminate multiplicity of policy equilibria, which arise if the policy maker acts under pure discretion. We apply a framework developed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debertoli and Nunes (2010) to a standard New Keynesian model...

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov...

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and...

The last few years papers have begun to analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in models incorporating nominal rigidities where social welfare is derived from the utility of agents. This paper examines whether this analysis provides support for the consensus assignment, where monetary policy...

This paper investigates the stabilization bias that arises in a model of monetary and fiscal policy stabilization of the economy, when assuming that the monetary authority put higher weight on inflation stabilization than society. We demonstrate that inflation-conservatism unambiguously leads to...

This paper investigates stability in a small open economy under fixed exchange rates when a proportion of consumers are credit constrained, and there exists some degree of inflation inertia. We show that the combination of these two elements may generate significant cyclical behaviour, and that...