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When is the standard analysis of common property extraction under free access correct? : A game-theoretic justification for non game-theoretic analyses

Brooks, Robin; Controneo, Jill; Murray, Michael P.; … - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000957226

When is the standard analysis of common property extraction under free access correct? : A game-theoretic justification for non game-theoretic analyses

Brooks, Robin; Controneo, Jill; Murray, Michael P.; … - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993686

Private storage of common property

Gaudet, Gérard; Moreaux, Michel; Salant, Stephen W. - 1997 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993720

When is the standard analysis of common property extraction under free access correct? : A game-theoretic justification for non-game-theoretic analyses

Brooks, Robin; Murray, Michael P.; Salant, Stephen W.; … - In: Journal of political economy 107 (1999) 4, pp. 843-858

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001396092

Private storage of common property

Gaudet, Gérard; Moreaux, Michel; Salant, Stephen W. - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 43 (2002) 2, pp. 280-302

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001660342

Putting Free-Riding to Work : A Partnership Solution to the Common-Property Problem

Heintzelman, Martin D. - 2009

The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in Ramp;D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a Partnership Solution to eliminate or at least mitigate these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012765688