deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and … additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In stochastic contests information feedback …

very different effects depending on the contest structure. We observe the highest rent dissipation in stochastic contests … when players only get feedback on own choices and earnings. In these contests aggregate expenditures usually exceed the …. In contrast, in deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get …

very different effects depending on the contest structure. We observe the highest rent dissipation in stochastic contests … when players only get feedback on own choices and earnings. In these contests aggregate expenditures usually exceed the …. In contrast, in deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get …

Managers often use tournaments which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In … from agents, especially in contests of a relatively larger size. Avoiding being last is shown to produce the lowest … variance of effort, be more effective and, in larger contests, more efficient than competing for the top. Finally, we show that …

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close agap in the literature by …