Mediation is a popular process to manage conflicts, but there is little systematic insight into its mechanisms. This paper discusses the results from an experiment in which a mediator can induce two conflict parties to behave cooperatively. If the mediator recommends cooperative behavior and...

The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the...

In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental...

In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental...

Mediation is a popular process to manage conflicts, but there is little systematic insight into its mechanisms. This paper discusses the results from an experiment in which a mediator can induce two conflict parties to behave cooperatively. If the mediator recommends cooperative behavior and...

The heterogeneous effort supply in intergroup contests explains why groups have a manager. However, the objectives of group managers and members often differ. Using data from an experiment this paper studies whether this conflict of interests affects leadership effectiveness. The managers have...