We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...

We study strategic information transmission in an organization consisting of an infinite sequence of individual decision makers. Each decision maker chooses an action and receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects...

In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements”, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and...

It has been proved in many studies that cheap talk has great influence on a players' choice of strategies. But the effect of cheap talk has still not been properly evaluated in game theory. Based on a novel game model with parameters denoting how one player cares for the other's payoff, we can...

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...

This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more...

Should one use words or money to foster trust of the other party if no means of enforcing trustworthiness are available? This paper reports an experiment studying the effectiveness of two types of mechanisms for promoting trust: a costly gift and a costless message as well as their mutual...

Should one use words or money to foster trust of the other party if no means of enforcing trustworthiness are available? This paper reports an experiment studying the effectiveness of two types of mechanisms for promoting trust: a costly gift and a costless message as well as their mutual...

Recent experimental evidence suggests that some people dislike telling lies, and tell the truth even at a cost. We use experiments as well to study the socio-demographic covariates of such lie aversion, and find gender and religiosity to be without predictive value. However, subjects’ major is...