Showing 1 - 10 of 314
We present a game-theoretical model that accounts for abundant experimental evidence from games with non-binding communication (‘cheap talk’). It is based on two key ideas: People are conditionally averse to break norms of honesty and fairness (i.e., the emotional cost of breaking a norm is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405113
We develop a game-theoretical model of honesty and fairness to study cooperation in social dilemma games with communication. It is based on two key intuitions. First, players suffer a utility cost if they break norms of honesty and fairness, and this cost is highest if most others comply with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051327
This paper investigates how the passage of time affects trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation. We use a hybrid lab and online experiment to provide the first evidence for the persistent power of communication. Even when 3 weeks pass between messages and actual choices, communication raises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920309
We report on an experiment using video technology to manipulate pre-play communication protocols in the lab and to study purely social effects of communication on donations and discrimination between potential receivers. The experimental design eliminates strategic factors by allowing two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980503
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations in order to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089179
Communication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501322
When truth conflicts with efficiency, can verbal communication destroy efficiency? Or are lies or vagueness used to hide inconvenient truths? We consider a sequential 2-player public good game in which the leader has private information about the value of the public good. This value can be low,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091313
This paper compares the effects of two leadership styles: leading by pre-game communication and leading by example using an iterated voluntary contribution game. We find that pre-game communication increases the level of individual contributions in the game and has essentially the same impact on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215365
We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides first and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before deciding whether or not to contribute. Without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038656
In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism with one-way communication. The relevance of one person's words is assessed by assigning exogenously the role of the "communicator" to one group member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange of promises is necessary for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003924235