Can campaign communications credibly transmit information about candidates' policy intentions? To answer this question, I develop and analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign communication in a two-candidate majority rule election with multidimensional policies. Candidate and voter preferences...

We continue the work of Aumann (Ann. Statist. 4 (1976), 1236-1239), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (J. Econ. Theory 28 (1982), 192-200) on common knowledge and consensus, reconsidering the arguments and the findings of both Aumann (1976) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and offering...

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the...

This paper studies repeated communication regarding a multidimensional collective decision in a large population. When preferences coincide but beliefs about the consequences of the various decisions diverge, it is shown, under some specific assumptions, that public communication causes the...

The paper analyzes a communication game between a decision-maker and a reputationally concerned expert drawn from a population of informed and uninformed experts. It departs from the literature [e.g. (Ottaviani and Sorensen(2006), Scharfstein and Stein (1990)] by considering the possibility that...

This paper studies when introducing verifiable communication choices between agents in a cheap-talk benchmark setting, with social tie, is beneficial to welfare. In our model agents have two ways to communicate their private information: either through a costly verifiable information (hard) link...

We analyze the interaction between the incentives for free-riding and information revelation among partners in a dynamic setting. Partners contribute to the value of a common project, but have private information about the success of their own contribution efforts. The desire to maintain a...

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an expert with informational superiority to decision makers who vote on a proposal. We show that an expert's simple cheap talk strategy can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their...

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited...

We consider common-value voting when a variable that is independent of the payoff-relevant state determines the meaning and precision of voters' private signals about the payoff-relevant state. Multiple senders sharing the same objective as the voters receive noisy signals that are contingent on...