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The value of verbal feedback in allocation decisions
Schmidt, Robert J.; Schwieren, Christiane; Vollmann, Martin - 2020
Depending on the context at hand, people's preference for receiving feedback might differ. Especially in allocation decisions that directly concern another individual, feedback from the affected person can have positive or negative value. We study such preferences in a laboratory experiment by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169494
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Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment
Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
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Negotiating cooperation under uncertainty : communication in noisy, indefinitely repeated interactions
Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian - 2018
Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in … environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well … understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring and communication structures in the laboratory. Under all monitoring …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925584
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Strategic communication : an experimental investigation
Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014
other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
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The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games
Langenbach, Pascal - 2014
recipients attach to communication opportunities (experiment 2). The first experiment shows that the effect of communication on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361495
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The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games
Langenbach, Pascal - 2016 - Revised version: April 2016
recipients attach to communication opportunities (experiment 2). The first experiment shows that the effect of communication on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671666
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Sequential persuasion
Li, Fei; Norman, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 639-675
This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587427
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Can communication mitigate strategic delays in investment timing?
Mermer, Ayse; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2023
how communication mitigates this free-riding problem in an investment-timing game. In our baseline investment-timing game …. If more investors invest at the same time, they share the costs. In the communication treatment, subjects can freely … communicate before choosing the investment time. We find that in groups of two players, communication increases cooperation and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600
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Social preferences, trust, and communication when the truth hurts
Gehle, Jonathan; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2024
We investigate how heterogeneous social preferences affect the communication of painful information in social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014564280
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Costly miscalibration
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 477-506
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367