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Who Do You Want to Talk to? Theory and Experiment of Network Formation under Strategic Information Transmission
Meng, Delong; Wang, Siyu - 2022
We combine network formation and information transmission in a simple model and predict that people reveal less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079960
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Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures : theory and evidence
Gehring, Kai; Kotsogiannēs, Chrēstos; Marchesi, Silvia - 2013
This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126407
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Smooth, strategic communication : conference paper
Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezsö - 2014
We study strategic communication between a Sender and Receiver who are both uncertain about their preferred actions. The Sender observes noisy signals about both players' ideal policies and then communicates with the Receiver. Even though Sender and Receiver disagree about ideal policies as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482440
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Power and the privilege of clarity : an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160
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Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures : Theory and Evidence
Dreher, Axel - 2013
This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075612
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Noisy talk
Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 395-440
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295
We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately … their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic … dominate farsighted equilibria, in particular if a social planner has designed the network optimally. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
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Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Meyer, Margaret A.; Moreno de Barreda, Inés; Nafziger, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1203-1235
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158784
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(Presentation Slides) Taking the Road Less Traveled by : Does Conversation Eradicate Pernicious Cascades?
Cao, H. Henry - 2018
We offer a model in which sequences of individuals often converge upon poor decisions and are prone to fads, despite communication of the payoff outcomes from past choices. This reflects both direct and indirect action-based information externalities. In contrast with previous cascades...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914362
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Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, T. J. S.; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
People in inferior bargaining positions are often vaguer when they express their preferences. In this paper, we explain how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653