Showing 1 - 10 of 504
This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312976
We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members, who possess private information about the state of the world, have to make a binary decision. We investigate incentives for truthful revelation of their information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434945
This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617906
This paper investigates the role of persuasion mechanisms in collective decision-making. A biased sender adopts a Bayesian persuasion mechanism to provide a committee of uninformed receivers with signals about the unknown state of the world. We compare public persuasion with private persuasion....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020009
This paper investigates the role of persuasion mechanisms in collective decision-making. A persuasion mechanism consists of a family of conditional distributions over the underlying state space and the generated noisy signals. A biased, perfectly informed sender adopts a persuasion mechanism to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020031
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238760
This paper studies when introducing verifiable communication choices between agents in a cheap-talk benchmark setting, with social tie, is beneficial to welfare. In our model agents have two ways to communicate their private information: either through a costly verifiable information (hard) link...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247925
We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information about the state of the world have to make a binary decision. We investigate incentives for truthful revelation of their information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430746
We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444227
This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779720