This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999-2007 period and...

This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of North American and European companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves may both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the...

Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...

We examine how developing an individual reputation for excellence affects a director's career outcomes in the labor market for boardroom talent. Using unique data on prestigious director awards, we find that individuals who experience very positive reputational shocks are typically rewarded with...