This paper adds to the empirical evidence on the extent to which stock-based pay incentivizes and rewards European corporate executives. It shows that the actual realized gains (that is, take-home compensation) from stock-based pay of CEOs in European publicly-listed firms may be underestimated...

Given the increasing use of equity-incentive compensation in Europe, we examine the effects of executive compensation and investor protection on payout policy. We find a negative (positive) relationship between equity-incentive compensation and dividends (repurchases). In countries with weak...

This study examines whether being listed on an Anglo-American stock exchange and/or having Anglo-American executive board members influences executive compensation, using company-level data from Germany, France and the Netherlands. Our sample consists of 581 executive directors, representing 142...

Die Finanzkrise befeuerte erneut die öffentliche Diskussion um die Vorstandsvergütung. Ein all-gemein geäußerter Kritikpunkt dabei ist die mangelnde horizontale Vergleichbarkeit. Trotz der öffentlichen Diskussion hierrüber gibt es jedoch bis dato im Wesentlichen nur anekdotische Evi-denz...

We argue that the dominance of principal-agent theory as an approach to investigating executive pay has led to an overly narrow focus which may be unhelpful when considering cross-country differences and probably also hinders within-country analysis. The paper discusses the interlinked nature of...

This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of North American and European companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves may both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the...