This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the use of performance targets in executive remuneration plans and its difficulty and attainability relative to past, expected and realized performance. From 31 December 2002, UK firms are required under the Directors’ Remuneration Report...

One of the core elements of corporate leadership – pay for performance – is soon to be paralyzed. But, as we propose here based on analysis of pay-for-performance of the FTSE100 companies, this mustn't be the case. If performance is measured relative to peers like in sports, executive...

This research examines the valuation effect and the factors associated with firms' decisions to expense executive stock options, as well as determinants of market reaction to expensing announcements. The likelihood of expensing is found to be higher for firms subject to fewer agency problems and...

This paper investigates firms’ decisions to resist individualized disclosure of top management compensation packages. We exploit the unique German setting, where recent legislation man-dates individualized disclosure of remuneration for members of the management board of listed corporations,...

The recent financial crisis has put the German banking sector under enormous pressure. Besides the macroeconomic drivers like, for example, the expansionary monetary policy in major countries, insufficient risk management and weak corporate governance systems have been identified as the main...

This paper investigates the firm performance implications associated with the choice of individual versus group compensation schemes for senior executives below the CEO level. We define individual compensation schemes where senior executives are compensated independently from other senior...

We examine whether board and ownership structure variables explain the level of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. After controlling for standard economic determinants (i.e., the firm's demand for a high-quality CEO, firm performance, and risk), we find that board and ownership...

Director compensation has become a fashionable topic: Cross-nationally, the earnings of executives and non-executive directors have risen significantly in recent years. Academic literature offers two hypotheses for this trend, a "fat cat" and an "optimal-contract" explanation. Proponents of the...

Managers in their terminal years have an incentive to manipulate earnings to enhance earnings based bonuses. We examine this horizon problem by considering the role of the compensation committee in setting terminal-year compensation. We predict that compensation committees are aware of the...

The Dodd Frank Act (2010) empowered shareholders by mandating non-binding voting on executive compensation. This paper investigates the determinants of shareholder dissent on the say-on-pay proposal. Data on S&P1500 firms between 2010 and 2012 reveal various findings. First, fewer than 3% of...