We examine whether short-term financial reporting objectives related to executive compensation and employment horizons affect managers' decisions to undertake accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) versus open market repurchases (OMRs). In an ASR, the firm repurchases borrowed shares and...

Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware...

Managers in their terminal years have an incentive to manipulate earnings to enhance earnings based bonuses. We examine this horizon problem by considering the role of the compensation committee in setting terminal-year compensation. We predict that compensation committees are aware of the...

Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware...

The incentive to manipulate earnings to enhance earnings-based compensation increases in managers' terminal years. We examine this horizon problem by considering the role of the compensation committee in setting terminal-year compensation. We predict that compensation committees are aware of the...