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The Arrow-Debreu paradigm faced with modern theories of contracting : a discussion of selected issues involving information and time
Guesnerie, Roger - In: Contract economics, (pp. 12-41). 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001282068
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Managerial incentives, corruption, and the internet : essays on moral hazard
Thiele, Henrik - 2000 - Als Ms. gedr.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001472780
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Debt contracts and collapse as competition phenomena
Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - In: Journal of financial intermediation 15 (2006) 4, pp. 556-574
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003395888
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Rewarding suppliers' performance via allocation of business
Liang, Liping; Atkins, Derek R. - In: Manufacturing & service operations management : M & SOM 23 (2021) 2, pp. 331-345
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507024
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Essays in industrial organization
Karle, Heiko - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003862846
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Endogenous labor market cycles
Li, Yunan; Wang, Cheng - In: International economic review 63 (2022) 2, pp. 849-881
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013280171
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Financial markets and competition on contracts
Campioni, Eloisa - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003528680
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Effects of qualification in expert markets with price competition and endogenous verifiability
Schneider, Tim; Bizer, Kilian - 2017
We investigate a market in which experts have a moral hazard problem because they need to invest in costly but unobservable effort to identify consumer problems. Experts have either high or low qualification and can invest either high or low effort in their diagnosis. High skilled experts are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687778
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Can competition reduce moral hazard? : a laboratory experiment
Rahman, Raja Abdar; Said, Farah - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014287200
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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511