Remittances are considered as an important component of GDP in many developing countries. In order to increase remittance inflows many countries are now actively involved in labour export and thereby competing with other labour exporting countries in the international market. In this paper we...

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from...

In this paper, we analyze the incentives of an incumbent and an entrant to migrate from an "old" technology to a "new" technology, and discuss how the terms of wholesale access affect this migration. We show that a higher access charge on the legacy network pushes the entrant firm to invest...

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from...

We develop a political-economy model of economic union and compare the competion regime to the coordination regime. Key policy differences emerge between the two regimes: concerning the generosity of the welfare state and the skill composition of migration. We argue that the differences between...