This paper studies the relationship between the auctioneer's provision of information and the level of competition in private value auctions. We use a general notion of informativeness which allows us to compare the efficient with the (privately) optimal amount of information provided by the...

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment? We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers’...

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Activities are carried out by external providers who are supervised by bureaucrats. Bureaucrats can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange...

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition in tournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares not only about the quality of the design but also about the design location. A priori not even the sponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discovered...

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Activities are carried out by external providers who are supervised by bureaucrats. Bureaucrats can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange...

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition in tournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the quality of the design but also about the design location. A priori not even the sponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discovered once he...