We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...

In this paper, we present a simple model of information provision in competitive markets. We depart from previous literature in that we allow firms to choose both prices and information revelation policies. Under the assumption that the underlying state is binary, we show that in the unique...

We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and competition issues, in order to reconsider the social value of private and public information in price and quantity games under imperfect and dispersed information, and to compare the corresponding outcomes in terms of equilibrium...

This paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet's news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous...

Technological progress is typically a result of trial-and-error research by competing firms. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead-end...

Technological progress is typically a result of trial-and-error research by competing firms. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead-end...

We study information disclosure and diversification in contests with technological uncertainty, where agents can pursue different technologies to compete in the contest, but there is uncertainty regarding which will be implemented ex post. The principal can credibly reveal some information about...

A characteristic of many information markets is that consumers can cross-check information, i.e. observe several information sources. To explore this we build a model of market for information where information outlets can only report a coarse signal and face a distribution of consumers with...

We consider a large rational expectations economy built on Han and Yang (2013) where traders can share information with each other via an information network and investigate the impact of network connectedness on market equilibrium outcomes. We find that in the equilibrium with endogenous...