We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes with other intermediaries on a common group of...

We analyze competition between data intermediaries collecting information on consumers, which they sell to firms for price discrimination purposes. We show that competition between data intermediaries benefits consumers by increasing competition between firms, and by reducing the amount of...

This paper investigates the strategies of a data broker in selling information to one or to two competing firms that can price-discriminate consumers. The data broker can strategically choose any segment of the consumer demand (information structure) to sell to firms that implement third-degree...

This paper investigates the strategies of a data broker in selling information to one or to two competing firms that can price-discriminate consumers. The data broker can strategically choose any segment of the consumer demand (information structure) to sell to firms that implement third-degree...

We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes with other intermediaries on a common group of...

We analyze competition between data intermediaries collecting information on consumers, which they sell to firms for price discrimination purposes. We show that competition between data intermediaries benefits consumers by increasing competition between firms, and by reducing the amount of...