contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …

contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each … component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …

Two players with independent private values compete for a prize in an all-pay contest. Before the contest, each player … equilibrium of the contest where players spy on each other, the equilibrium effort to compete for the prize is non-decreasing in …

-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome … favorite will try to discourage the underdog─so that the contest unravels. Self-disclosure is optimal even though a weak …

. Our benchmark result is that total effort is maximized by a unique grand contest and contestant exclusions decrease total … strategy space of the designer so as to obtain a greater total effort than that of a unique grand contest, and we find that; (i …) if the designer can make contestants' efforts valid for competing simultaneously in more than one contest, then total …

main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian … while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. This …

not seem to participate in retaliatory escalation of conflict behaviour. However, compared to other players, captains …