We analyze entry of a firm with a new and differentiated product into a market with two properties: An existing … consumers with the degree of taste heterogeneity leads to non-monotone effects of both parameters on entry. In particular, a … higher captive share can support entry when heterogeneity is low but not when it is high, and higher taste heterogeneity (i …

We test for the distributional effects of regulation and entry in the mobile telecommunications sector in a highly …. Next, we use a demand and supply equilibrium framework to simulate prices and the distribution of welfare without entry and … mobile termination rate regulation. We find that regulation benefits consumers significantly more than entry does, and that …

collusion possible where it was previously unsustainable. However, it also may make collusion impracticable where it had …

Standard models of collusion require that all firms are forward-looking and strategic. When one firm displays naive …

tacit collusion or strong competition in dependence of additional security considerations …

assumption is robust in experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition …