Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by the theoretical prediction that more market power causes firms to collect ever more data from their users. We investigate the relationship...

Despite the prevalence of both competitive forces and patterns of collaboration within academic communities, studies on research productivity generally treat universities as independent entities. By exploring the research productivity of all academic economists employed at 81 universities and 17...

We analyze the linking and versioning strategies of a media firm when facing competition from blogs, search engines and news aggregators. First, we show that when the publisher competes against a blog it is less likely to release a fighting version if this generates signi ficant spillovers for...

In light of recent trends in social networking services that encourage users of platforms to “share,” “recommend,” and “do activities” with others, this work analyzes platform competition in two-sided markets that exhibit direct (or within-) network effect in addition to conventional...

This online appendix to "Insulated Platform Competition" includes proofs and details of our applications.The paper to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694317" http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694317

In this article, we analyze the dynamic competition between two platform firms (A&B) in two-sided markets with network externalities. In Period 1, platform A or B wins the contest in a first stage and can serve the two-sided market monopolistically in a second stage. In Period 2, the two...

I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher...

We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...

We study competitive behavior in all-pay Tullock (1980) contests with identity-dependent externalities (IDEs) governed by a fixed network. First, we introduce a model of network contest games, in which the prize generates an externality---which may be positive or negative---that impacts each...