Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by the theoretical prediction that more market power causes firms to collect ever more data from their users. We investigate the relationship...

Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the combination of market power and massive data collection in digital markets. This concern is fueled by the theoretical prediction that more market power causes firms to collect ever more data from their users. We investigate the relationship...

Current merger review law is critically flawed. Courts in Clayton Act Section 7 cases consider the likelihood that a merger will harm competition as a threshold question before considering the size of harm that could ensue. Under current law, to block a merger a judge must find that the deal is...

Despite the prevalence of both competitive forces and patterns of collaboration within academic communities, studies on research productivity generally treat universities as independent entities. By exploring the research productivity of all academic economists employed at 81 universities and 17...

I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher...

In light of recent trends in social networking services that encourage users of platforms to “share,” “recommend,” and “do activities” with others, this work analyzes platform competition in two-sided markets that exhibit direct (or within-) network effect in addition to conventional...

Merger review in the United States has overlooked a significant competition harm: increasing risk. Mergers can increase both direct and systemic risk. There is now persuasive evidence that negative shocks to a firm can harm the firm’s consumers and trading partners, leading to national...

In models of political economy, institutionalization of free and open elections is presented as infusing competition into a previously monopolized regime. Due to elections, representative democracies are thought to reflect the will of the majority as opposed to the will of the elites. I...

In this article, we analyze the dynamic competition between two platform firms (A&B) in two-sided markets with network externalities. In Period 1, platform A or B wins the contest in a first stage and can serve the two-sided market monopolistically in a second stage. In Period 2, the two...