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We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Activities are carried out by external providers who are supervised by bureaucrats. Bureaucrats can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014129367
We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Activities are carried out by external providers who are supervised by bureaucrats. Bureaucrats can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014108666
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011860882
Competition enforcement is characterised by asymmetric information and Competition Authorities have been provided with inspection powers to reduce the informative gap. The paper looks at competition inspections from different perspectives. First of all, the paper analyses convergences of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051395
This paper focuses on institutional design aspects of the enforcement of competition law and other procompetitive regulation in fintech markets. Those interventions may prove necessary because the market entry of technology-enabled innovation may depend on accessing other (competing) market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237978
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659017
This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production, while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they issue a licence to any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759708
The benefits of bureaucratic discretion depend on the extent to which it is used for public benefit versus exploited for private gain. We study the relationship between discretion and corruption in Italian government procurement auctions, using a confidential database of firms and procurement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012224342
This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are supposed to grant licences to firms that satisfy certain requirements. Firms have to invest into satisfying these requirements. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they give the licence to any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047806
This paper examines the main determinants of firms tax evasion and corruption in the formal industrial sector. In our model psychological morale of bureaucratic agents are important to explain corruption.It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113076